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Abstract
Collaborative spectrum sensing can significantly improve the detection performance of secondary
unlicensed users (SUs). However, the performance of collaborative sensing is vulnerable to sensing data
falsification attacks, where malicious SUs (attackers) submit manipulated sensing reports to mislead
the fusion center’s decision on spectrum occupancy. Moreover, attackers may not follow the fusion
center’s decision regarding their spectrum access. This paper considers a challenging attack scenario
where multiple rational attackers overhear all honest SUs’ sensing reports and cooperatively maximize
attackers’ aggregate spectrum utilization. We show that, without attack-prevention mechanisms, honest
SUs are unable to transmit over the licensed spectrum, and they may further be penalized by the primary
user for collisions due to attackers’ aggressive transmissions. To prevent such attacks, we propose two
novel attack-prevention mechanisms with direct and indirect punishments. The key idea is to identify
collisions to the primary user that should not happen if all SUs follow the fusion center’s decision.
Unlike prior work, the proposed simple mechanisms do not require the fusion center to identify and
exclude attackers. The direct punishment can effectively prevent all attackers from behaving maliciously.
The indirect punishment is easier to implement and can prevent attacks when the attackers care enough
about their long-term reward.
This work is supported by the General Research Funds (Project Number 412509) established under the University Grant
Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China. Corresponding author: Jianwei Huang.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radios enable secondary unlicensed users (SUs) to opportunistically access licensed
spectrum bands when they are not being used by primary licensed users (PUs), and thus can
effectively improve spectrum utilization [10]. As a key technology for realizing opportunistic
spectrum access while protecting PU communications, spectrum sensing aims to detect the
presence or absence of a primary signal with high accuracy. To provide sufficient protection,
spectrum sensing must be able to detect even a very weak primary signal, e.g., -20 dB for a
DTV signal in the IEEE 802.22 WRANs [37]. To meet such stringent requirement, researchers
have proposed the use of collaborative spectrum sensing to improve detection performance
by exploiting sensor location diversity [11], [16], [30], [33]. In collaborative spectrum sensing,
multiple sensors1 sense the spectrum individually and then report their sensing results to a central
node (i.e., fusion center) for a final decision on spectrum occupancy.
Collaborative sensing, however, is vulnerable to critical attacks, such as sensing data falsifi-
cation attacks, while its detection is difficult. In CRNs, sensors can be deployed in unattended
and hostile environments, and thus can be compromised by attackers. Thus, compromised or
malicious sensors can intentionally send distorted sensing results to the fusion center in order
to disrupt the incumbent detection process [8], [23], [31]. Such attacks can be easily launched
due to the openness of the low-layer protocols stacks of cognitive radio devices [44]. However,
it is challenging for the fusion center to accurately validate the integrity of sensing reports
because of the two unique features in spectrum sensing—unpredictability in wireless channel
signal propagations and lack of coordination between PUs and SUs. The sensing data falsification
attack will ultimately result in a waste of spectrum opportunities (in the form of false alarms),
and/or excessive interference to the PU communications (in the form of missed detections).
Therefore, this poses a significant threat to the implementation of cognitive radio technology,
and thus calls for efficient attack detection and prevention mechanisms.
In this paper, we consider an attack scenario in which multiple attackers (i.e., compromised
SUs/sensors) cooperate to maximize their aggregate spectrum utilization in cognitive radio
networks (CRNs). Despite the serious threat posed by collaborated attacks, attacker collaboration
have not been fully considered in CRNs. We focus on the particularly challenging attack scenario
1We use the terms “SU” and “sensor” interchangeably throughout the paper.
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2in which attackers can overhear all honest SUs’ sensing reports, whereas the honest SUs are
unaware of the existence of attackers. This information asymmetry gives the attackers maximum
capability to launch attacks and achieve their goals. We design attack-prevention mechanisms
that safeguard collaborative sensing in such a challenging attack scenario, which constitutes the
main contribution of this paper.
We consider two different attack scenarios: the “attack-and-run” scenario in which attackers
only care about an immediate reward, and the “stay-with-attacks” scenario in which attackers care
about the long-term reward. We first analyze the impact of attacks on honest SUs in the absence
of attack-prevention mechanisms. Then, we propose two attack-prevention mechanisms: a direct
punishment scheme that can effectively prevent attacks in both scenarios mentioned above, and
an indirect punishment scheme that is easier to implement and effectively prevents attacks in the
“stay-with-attacks” scenario. The key idea of both mechanisms is to discourage attackers from
launching attacks by designing efficient attack detection and punishment strategies.
The key results and organization of this paper are summarized as follows.
• A spectrum-sharing model with collision penalty: In Sections II and III, we introduce the
concept of collision penalty, which requires the SUs to compensate a PU for collision
in utilizing the spectrum. The collision penalty is designed to protect the PU’s exclusive
spectrum usage and encourage the PU’s opening of its licensed spectrum to SUs.
• Understanding cooperative attackers’ optimal behaviors: In Section IV, we theoretically
show that in the absence of attack-prevention mechanisms, attackers will utilize all spectrum
opportunities exclusively, whereas honest SUs cannot transmit and may even suffer from
the collision penalty caused by attackers (see Table I).
• Effective direct punishment: In Section V, we design a direct punishment mechanism that
can detect attacks and punish the attackers. This requires an efficient way for the fusion
center to directly punish SUs. The proposed mechanism can prevent all attacks in both
“attack-and-run” and “stay-with-attacks” scenarios (see Table I). We further show that a
single attacker makes the network most vulnerable under this mechanism.
• Effective indirect punishment: In Section VI, we propose an indirect attack-prevention
mechanism that is easy to implement when direct punishment is infeasible. The key idea is
to terminate collaborative sensing when an attack is detected. The proposed mechanism can
prevent all attacks if the attackers care enough about their long-term reward (see Table I).
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3TABLE I
KEY RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT ATTACK SCENARIOS
Attack Scenarios Attack-and-run Stay-with-attacks
No Punishment (Sec.IV) Attacks happen and honest SUs always lose transmission opportunities
Direct Punishment (Sec.V) Completely prevent attacks
Indirect Punishment (Sec.VI) Cannot prevent attacks
If attackers focus on long-term reward: completely prevent attacks;
If attackers focus on short-term reward: partially prevent attacks.
Unlike the direct punishment, the presence of a larger number of attackers may make the
network more vulnerable.
A. Related Work
There has been a growing interest in attack-resilient collaborative spectrum sensing in CRNs
(e.g., [8], [23]–[25], [31]). Liu et al. [5] exploited the problem of detecting unauthorized usage
of a primary licensed spectrum. In this work, the path-loss effect is studied to detect anoma-
lous spectrum usage, and a machine-learning technique is proposed to solve the general case.
Chen et al. [23] focused on a passive approach with robust signal processing, and investigated
robustness of various data-fusion techniques against sensing-targeted attacks. Kaligineedi et al.
[25] presented outlier detection schemes to identify abnormal sensing reports. Min et al. [8]
proposed a mechanisms for detecting and filtering out abnormal sensing reports by exploiting
shadow-fading correlation in received primary signal strengths among nearby SUs. Fatemieh et
al. [24] used outlier measurements inside each SU cell and collaboration among neighboring
cells to identify cells with a significant number of malicious nodes. Li et al. in [31] detected
possible abnormalities according to SU sensing report histories.
Our work is different from existing approaches in three aspects. First, we consider cooperation
among attackers, so the attacks are much more challenging to prevent. Second, unlike the previous
work which focused on sensing data falsification attacks, we also consider the case where the
attackers violate the fusion center’s decision regarding spectrum access. Finally, our proposed
attack-prevention mechanisms can easily prevent attacks without differentiating attackers from
honest SUs.
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: Sensing reports first
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Fusion center
Fig. 1. An illustration of cooperative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks: The figure shows a secondary network
with N = 6 SUs including M = 2 malicious SUs (i.e., attackers). The SUs periodically perform spectrum sensing and report
the local (binary) decisions to the fusion center (the solid arrows). The fusion center makes a final decision and announces it to
the SUs (the dotted arrows).
II. PRELIMINARY
A. CRN Model and Assumptions
We consider an infrastructure-based secondary CRN, which consists of a single base station
(or fusion center) and a set of SUs (or sensors). The fusion center coordinates SUs’ collaborative
spectrum sensing and their access to a licensed PU channel. We assume that the fusion center is
maintained by a trusted network administrator and has high computation power. For collaborative
spectrum sensing, all SUs (i) measure the primary signal strength on the same target channel,
(ii) make local binary decisions on the presence or absence of the primary signal, and (iii) report
the binary decisions to the fusion center [11], [21]. Based on the reported sensing results, the
fusion center makes a global decision and broadcasts this result to the SUs.
There is a set of N = {1, . . . , N} SUs in the network, M of which are attackers as shown in
Fig. 1. We assume that there is at least one honest SU in the network, i.e., N−M ≥ 1; otherwise,
it would be infeasible to defeat attacks. The honest SUs fairly share the licensed channel among
themselves when the channel is available to them (i.e., it is not being used by the PU). The
attackers (i.e., malicious or compromised SUs), on the other hand, behave to maximize their
own aggregate reward (e.g., achievable throughput) by manipulating their sensing reports so that
the fusion center makes a wrong decision. In particular, we focus on the case that attackers
can overhear all honest SUs’ sensing reports to the fusion center before they collaboratively
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5manipulating their sensing results. We assume that attackers can communicate with each other
(and thus know the number of attackers), while the honest SUs only communicate with the fusion
center. The honest SUs do not have to be strategic, and they do not need to make decisions by
considering other honest SUs and attackers’ decisions. In other words, the honest users do not
play a game with the attackers.
To make the analysis tractable and obtain useful engineering insights, we make the following
assumptions throughout the paper.
A1. All SUs have the same detection performance in terms of primary false alarm (Pf ) and
missed detection (Pm) probabilities.2
A2. The PU’s spectrum occupancy is the same for all SUs3 and is independent across
different time slots.4
A3. All SUs have the same transmission rate in utilizing the channel.
In Appendix B, we relax both assumptions A1 and A3 by studying SUs’ heterogeneous detec-
tion performances and heterogeneous transmission rates. We will focus on the most challenging
case of single attacker (as shown in Theorem 2 and Observation 1 in Section V), and show that
the direct punishment mechanism proposed in Section V can still prevent all attacks. Similarly,
the effectiveness of the indirect punishment mechanism proposed in Section VI can also apply
to the two heterogeneous scenarios.
Regarding the PU’s temporal channel usage statistics, we denote PI as the probability that
the channel is actually idle. Thus, the channel is busy with the probability 1− PI . We assume
that SUs (including attackers and fusion center) know the probability PI before collaborative
spectrum sensing as in [7], [9], [31]. This is reasonable if SUs and fusion center can collect
PU’s activity information from PU side and calculate PI using various methods as in [3]. Such
2A false alarm occurs when an SU detects an idle channel as busy, and a missed detection occurs when an SU detects a
busy channel as idle. The detection performance depends on the SU’s physical location (relative to the primary transmitter) and
fading environment.
3This is true when SUs stay relatively close compared to the PU’s coverage area.
4This assumption is frequently used in the literature (e.g., [7], [9], [31]), and is reasonable when we try to approximate the
case where PU’s traffic changes fast (e.g., wireless microphones) and the time slot is relatively long. We may need to study
the correlation between spectrum occupancies when PU’s traffic changes slowly over time (e.g., TV transmitters). Analyzing
the correlated case requires a much more complicated Markov decision process (MDP) model than the one that we used in
Section VI, and we consider this as a future direction.
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Phase I Phase II
…... …...
t-1 t t+1
time slot
Fig. 2. The behaviors of SUs in each time slot: Phase I: SUs sense and report, and then the fusion center fuses all SUs’
reports and announces the result; Phase II: honest SUs transmit or wait depending on the fusion center’s decision. Attackers do
not need to follow the fusion center’s decision.
information collection is possible for SUs by examining PU’s published historical activity report
or purchasing the history report from PU directly. Actually, the precision of PI does not affect
SUs’ decisions and our analytical results. This is because attackers and the fusion center make
decisions based on their belief of PI .
B. Spectrum Sensing and Opportunistic Access Model
We assume a time-slotted model for opportunistic spectrum access, as in Fig. 2. Such time-
slotted channel access model has been widely assumed in the literature [19], [34], [43], including
the IEEE 802.22 standard draft [37]. Each time slot consists of two phases:
• Phase I (Collaborative Spectrum Sensing): As shown in Fig. 1, each SU performs sensing
individually and makes a local binary decision (i.e., 0/1) on channel occupancy: 1 if it detects
the PU’s signal (i.e., busy), and 0 otherwise (i.e., idle). All honest SUs truthfully report their
sensing decisions to the fusion center. The attackers, on the other hand, overhear the sensing
reports from the honest SUs before sending their own reports (which may be different from
their actual local sensing decisions) to the fusion center. Based on the reports from all
SUs (including the attackers), the fusion center makes a global decision and broadcasts
it to all SUs in the network. We assume that the sensing reports and announcements are
communicated via a dedicated and reliable control channel with no communication errors.
Under this one-hop network configuration, the attackers can overhear the control channel
and easily decode honest SUs’ reports like the fusion center.5 Also, even if we extend this
5Note that end-to-end encryptions of reports sent from SUs to the fusion center could be too complicated and expensive to
implement to prevent attackers’ overhearing, as the control channel often can only support very low date rate transmissions.
October 22, 2018 DRAFT
7one-hop communication network to a multi-hop network, it is still possible for attackers to
overhear all honest SUs’ reports as long as one attacker is located near the fusion center.
• Phase II (Spectrum Sharing): If the fusion center announces the channel to be idle, then
honest SUs will transmit in Phase II. If it announces the channel to be busy, then honest
SUs will wait. The attackers may transmit or wait in both cases. We assume that SUs who
transmit in Phase II equally share the transmission time. More advanced link scheduling
and power control may improve the overall network performance in Phase II, but is not the
focus of this paper. Let us normalize the total transmission rate of the channel to 1.6 More
specifically, X SUs transmitting together leads to 1/X rate for each involved SU by using
TDMA mode.
To summarize, the attackers can launch attacks in two different ways: (i) in Phase I by reporting
falsified sensing results, and (ii) in Phase II by disobeying the fusion center’s announcement.
C. Collision Penalty
In order to increase social welfare, the government regulatory bodies (e.g., FCC in the U.S.
and Ofcom in the U.K.) are pushing new spectrum-sharing schemes to allow the coexistence of
PUs and SUs. There are two main obstacles in persuading PUs to share their licensed spectrum
bands: (i) PUs’ fear of interference or service disruption caused by SUs, and (ii) lack of economic
incentives to PUs for spectrum sharing. To achieve these goals while efficiently preventing
attacks, we adopt the notion of “collision penalty”, similar in [40], as an incentive mechanism to
allow for an efficient PU-SU coexistence. When a collision happens, we assume that the PU will
charge a collision penalty Cp to all SUs in the network. This collision penalty will compensate
PUs for potential performance loss due to collisions.7 The reasons why PU charges all SUs are
as follows.
• Complexity consideration: If the PU does not know each SU’s transmission characteristics
(e.g., modulation and coding schemes), it is impossible for him to check which subset of
SUs cause collision. Also, the attackers can secure their transmissions (e.g., via MAC-layer
6If the total transmission rate of the channel is r ( 6= 1), we can change Cp and Cb (defined later in the paper) to Cp/r and
Cb/r and all results will go through.
7The penalty Cp can be in the form of monetary payments from SUs, or reduced transmission opportunities of SUs, or
cooperative transmission by SUs to improve the PU’s performance [22], [40].
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8encryptions) to avoid being detected and identified. Moreover, it is highly complex and
time-consuming for the PU to identify which SUs cause usage collision. Such identification
incurs a detection delay and is thus not desirable [8], [24], [25].
• Responsibility consideration: In the cooperative spectrum sensing, each SU contributes its
sensing result to the final decision of the fusion center, and each regular SU follows the
final decision. If a missed detection occurs, the PU should believe all SUs to be responsible
for their imperfect sensing. Even some missed detection events are caused by attackers, it
is impossible for the PU (without sensing reports) to identify and punish attackers only.
Based on the above discussion, we define the PU’s expected utility in one time slot as the
sum of the PU’s successful transmission rate and collision penalty collected from N SUs, i.e.,
UPU(Cp) = (1− γ(Cp))V (rPU) + γ(Cp)NCp, (1)
where γ(Cp) is the collision probability of the PU’s transmission due to SUs’ aggressive access
and is decreasing in Cp, rPU is the PU’s transmission rate, and V (rPU) is PU’s utility of achieving
rate rPU . A larger Cp makes SUs more conservative in spectrum access and leads to a lower
γ(Cp). Hence, a larger Cp achieves a high successful transmission rate (in the first term in
Eq. (1)), but may also lead to a low compensation from SUs (the second term in Eq. (1)).
III. DECISION FUSION RULE
Of the various decision fusion rules for collaborative sensing, we adopt the commonly used
OR-rule. Ghasemi and Sousa [38] showed that the OR-rule performs better than other rules
in many cases of practical interest. Here we will discuss the OR-rule as a special case of the
general n-out-of-N rule, and derive the conditions of Cp under which the OR-rule is theoretically
optimal. We elaborate the decision fusion rule by focusing on the case in which all SUs are
honest.
At the end of Phase I in each time slot (see Fig. 2), the fusion center collects a binary sensing
report Di ∈ {0 (idle), 1 (busy)} from each SU i ∈ N , and makes a decision using the following
n-out-of-N rule [11]:

H0 (primary signal does not exist) : if
∑
i∈N Di < n.
H1 (primary signal exists) : if
∑
i∈N Di ≥ n
(2)
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9According to Eq. (2), the fusion center infers the channel to be busy H1 when at least n-out-
of-N SUs report 1 (busy); otherwise, it infers the channel to be idle H0. The optimal selection
of the threshold n depends on the system parameters and the reward functions of the SUs [21].
When n = 1, we have the OR-rule.
We show that when both of the following conditions hold, the OR-rule provides the highest
reward for each SU within the family of n-out-of-N rules.
1) When all SUs report 0 (i.e., ∑i∈N Di = 0), each SU obtains a positive expected reward
by sharing the spectrum opportunity after taking into account the false alarm and missed
detection probabilities:
Pr
(
idle|
∑
i∈N
Di = 0
)
1
N
− Pr
(
busy|
∑
i∈N
Di = 0
)
Cp > 0. (3)
The expected reward is the difference between the expected transmission rate and the
collision penalty. Here, idle and busy denote the actual state of the channel instead of
the fusion center’s announcement (i.e., H0 or H1).
2) When at least one SU reports 1 (i.e., ∑i∈N Di ≥ 1), every SU obtains a negative expected
reward by sharing the spectrum opportunity:
Pr
(
idle|
∑
i∈N
Di ≥ 1
)
1
N
− Pr
(
busy|
∑
i∈N
Di ≥ 1
)
Cp < 0. (4)
We can write these two conditions more compactly by defining the following two notations:
P IN,k : = Pr
(
idle|
∑
i∈N
Di = k
)
=
PI(1− Pf)N−kP kf
PI(1− Pf)N−kP kf + (1− PI)(Pm)
N−k(1− Pm)k
, (5)
PBN,k : = Pr
(
busy|
∑
i∈N
Di = k
)
= 1− P IN,k. (6)
Notice that P IN,k in Eq. (5) is decreasing in k, and PBN,k in Eq. (6) is increasing in k. Thus,
Eq. (4) is decreasing in ∑i∈N Di = k. This implies that with more SUs reporting 1, SUs have
less incentive to transmit. We can summarize the range of Cp satisfying both Eqs. (3) and (4)
as follows.
Theorem 1: At the fusion center, the OR-rule outperforms the other n-out-of-N rules (n > 1)
when the collision penalty Cp satisfies the following condition.
Condition.I :
PI
1− PI
(
1− Pf
Pm
)N
1
N
PmPf
(1− Pm)(1− Pf)
< Cp <
PI
1− PI
(
1− Pf
Pm
)N
1
N
. (7)
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Fig. 3. Cp range for the OR-rule’s optimal application with (PI , Pf , Pm) = (0.6, 0.08, 0.08).
The lower-bound of Cp in Condition.I discourages the SUs from transmitting when at least
one SU reports 1 (busy). The upper-bound of Cp in Condition.I encourages SUs to transmit
when all N SUs report 0 (idle). In the rest of the paper, we assume that Cp always satisfies
Condition.I.
In Region II of Figure 3, the OR-rule outperforms the other n-out-of-N rules with various
number of SUs and collision penalty Cp.8 As the number of SUs increases, the bounds on
Cp increase. For a fixed Cp, more SUs lead to the increase of false alarm probability and the
decrease of missed detection probability for the whole system. Then the SUs tend to strategically
transmit more aggressively even when some SU(s) reports 1 (busy). To prevent this and ensure
the optimality of the OR-rule, a higher value of Cp is required. The other decision fusion rules
in Region III of Fig. 3 is not the focus of this paper. However, our analysis of the OR-rule can
still apply to Region III, since in later analysis we consider all possible Cp values and do not
restrict our attention to Condition.I.
IV. ATTACKERS’ BEHAVIORS WITHOUT PUNISHMENT
In this section, we analyze the behavior of cooperative attackers when the system lacks attack-
prevention mechanisms. The results in this section will serve as a benchmark for the proposed
attack-prevention mechanisms in Sections V and VI.
We first define some useful notations.
8According to 802.22 WRAN standard, Pf and Pm must be less than 10% [37].
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• State set S: A state s ∈ S describes the local sensing decisions of the honest SUs and
attackers: (∑i∈N\MDi,∑i∈MDi). The size of set S is (N−M+1)(M+1).9 The attackers
know the exact state in a particular time slot by overhearing the honest SUs’ reports to the
fusion center.
• Attackers’ action set A: The action am of an attacker m ∈ M is a tuple, (report to the
fusion center in Phase I, spectrum access decision in Phase II), which has 4 possibilities:
(idle, wait), (busy, wait), (idle, transmit), and (busy, transmit). Define a = {am, ∀m ∈ M}
as the action vector of all attackers, and A includes all possible a.10
• Attackers’ expected aggregate reward R(a, s): This reward depends on the state s and
the attackers’ actions a in one time slot. It denotes the difference between the attackers’
aggregate transmission rate and their expected payment to PU due to usage collision in one
time slot.
For each state s, the attackers choose a to maximize the expected aggregate reward in a single
time slot, i.e.,
max
a∈A
R(a, s). (8)
We discuss the solution to Eq. (8) in the three following cases.
A. All SUs sense the channel idle
Proposition 1: Given the state s =
(∑
i∈N\MDi = 0,
∑
i∈MDi = 0
)
, the cooperative attack-
ers’ optimal actions are: at least one attacker adopts the action (busy, transmit) and the other
attackers (if any) adopt the action (idle, transmit). That is, at least one attacker will report the
channel busy in Phase I and all attackers will transmit exclusively over the channel in Phase II.
The fusion center will announce a wrong decision H1 in this case. The attackers’ expected
aggregate reward is:
R(a, s) = P IN,0 −MP
B
N,0Cp > 0, (9)
where the definitions of P IN,0 and PBN,0 are given in Eqs. (5) and (6), respectively. An honest SU
does not transmit, but may suffer from the collision penalty caused by attackers and receives a
9The value of Di can be either 0 or 1, thus
∑
i∈N\MDi ranges from 0 to N −M and
∑
i∈MDi ranges from 0 to M .
10Note that if all attackers have the same action sets, the fusion center may find it easier to identify them by checking their
reports over time.
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negative expected reward
RhonestSU(s) = −P
B
N,0Cp < 0. (10)
Proof. Given the state s =
(∑
i∈N\MDi = 0,
∑
i∈MDi = 0
)
in a time slot, the attackers may
report truthfully and falsely in the Phase I:
• If all attackers report 0 (i.e., ∑i∈M D˜i =∑i∈MDi = 0) in Phase I, then the announcement
at the fusion center is H0 and all honest SUs will transmit. Consider MT (0 ≤ MT ≤ M)
attackers choosing to transmit rather than wait in Phase II. The attackers’ expected aggregate
reward in this time slot is:
Ra(s)(MT ) =MT
(
P IN,0
1
N −M +MT
)
−MP IN,0Cp,
which is increasing in MT . Thus all attackers will transmit, i.e., MT = M . Then the
attackers’ expected aggregate reward is
Ra(s) = M
(
P IN,0
1
N
− PBN,0Cp
)
> 0, (11)
due to Condition.I in (7).
• If at least one attacker reports 1 (i.e., ∑i∈M D˜i ≥ 1) in Phase I, then the announcement at
the fusion center is H1 and all honest SUs will not transmit.
– Consider MT (1 ≤ MT ≤ M) attackers choosing to transmit. The attackers’ expected
aggregate reward is given by (9), which does depend on M˜ and is larger than (11).
– If all attackers wait, the attackers’ expected aggregate reward equals 0, which is less
than (9).
By comparing (11) and (9) with different actions, we conclude that at least one attacker will
report 1 and steal the opportunity from honest SUs to utilize the channel exclusively. As a result,
all honest SUs will not transmit but may suffer the collision penalty as in (10).
Proposition 1 shows that an attack always happens when all SUs sense the channel idle.
B. All honest SUs sense the channel idle, but some attacker(s) senses the channel busy
Here we define the attackers’ aggregate sensing result
∑
i∈MDi as M¯ .
Proposition 2: Given the state s =
(∑
i∈N\MDi = 0,
∑
i∈MDi = M¯ ≥ 1
)
, the cooperative
attackers’ optimal actions are as follows.
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• If P I
N,M¯
< MPB
N,M¯
Cp, then at least one attacker adopts the action (busy, wait) and the other
attackers (if any) adopt the action (idle, wait). This leads to a correct announcement H1
(busy) at the fusion center. Since no one transmits, the attackers and the honest SUs all get
zero reward,
R(a, s) = RhonestSU(s) = 0. (12)
• If P I
N,M¯
≥MPB
N,M¯
Cp, then at least one attacker adopts the action (busy, transmit) and the
other attackers (if any) adopt the action (idle, transmit). This leads to a correct announcement
H1 (busy) at the fusion center. Only attackers will transmit exclusively in Phase II, their
expected aggregate reward is:
R(a, s) = P IN,M¯ −MP
B
N,M¯Cp > 0. (13)
An honest SU does not transmit in Phase II, but may suffer from the collision penalty
caused by attackers’ transmissions and receives a negative expected reward
RhonestSU(s) = −P
B
N,M¯Cp < 0. (14)
Proof. Given the state
(∑
i∈N\MDi = 0,
∑
i∈MDi = M¯ ≥ 1
)
in one time slot, the attackers
may report truthfully or falsely in Phase I:
• If all attackers report 0 (i.e., ∑i∈M D˜i =∑i∈MDi = 0) in Phase I, then the announcement
at the fusion center is H0 and all honest SUs will transmit. Similar to the proof in Subsection
IV-A, it is optimal for all attackers to transmit. Their expected aggregate reward is:
Ra(s) = M
(
P IN,M¯
1
N
− PBN,M¯Cp
)
< 0, (15)
due to Condition.I in (7).
• If at least one attacker reports 1 (i.e., ∑i∈M D˜i ≥ 1) in Phase I, then the announcement at
the fusion center is H1 and all honest SUs will not transmit.
– If at least one attacker transmits in Phase II, the attackers’ expected aggregate reward is
given by (13). Notice that (13) is negative only if the collision penalty is high enough.
– If all attackers wait in Phase II, the attackers’ expected aggregate reward equals 0.
By comparing (13) and 0 with different actions, we conclude that at least one attacker will
report 1 to ensure that the correct announcement is made at the fusion center. But the attackers
may transmit over the channel exclusively and the honest SUs may suffer from the collision
penalty caused by the attackers with an expected reward in (14).
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Proposition 2 indicates that an attack only happens when the benefit of exclusive transmission
is large enough to compensate the potential collision penalty for the attackers.
C. Some honest SUs sense the channel busy
Proposition 3: Given the state s =
(∑
i∈N\MDi = K ≥ 1,
∑
i∈MDi = M¯ ≥ 0
)
,
11 the an-
nouncement at the fusion center is always correct with H1 (busy), and the attackers’ optimal
actions are as follows.
• If P I
N,K+M¯
< MPB
N,K+M¯
Cp, then each attacker can either take the action (busy, wait) or
(idle, wait). Since no one transmits, the attackers and the honest SUs all get zero reward,
R(a, s) = RhonestSU(s) = 0. (16)
• If P I
N,K+M¯
≥MPB
N,K+M¯
Cp, then each attacker can either take the action (busy, transmit) or
(idle, transmit). As only attackers will transmit in Phase II, their expected aggregate reward
is:
R(a, s) = P IN,K+M¯ −MP
B
N,K+M¯Cp. (17)
An honest SU does not transmit in Phase II, but may suffer from the collision penalty
caused by attackers’ transmissions and receives a negative expected reward
RhonestSU(s) = −P
B
N,K+M¯Cp < 0. (18)
Proof. Given the state s =
(∑
i∈N\MDi = K ≥ 1,
∑
i∈MDi = M¯ ≥ 0
)
, no matter what
attackers report in Phase I, the announcement at the fusion center is always H1, and the honest
SUs will not transmit in Phase II.
• If some attackers transmit in Phase II, the attackers’ expected aggregate reward is given by
(17).
• If all attackers wait in Phase II, the attackers’ expected aggregate reward equals 0. Each
honest SU’s immediate expected reward also equals 0.
By comparing (17) to 0, we conclude that the fusion center always makes the correct an-
nouncement H1 regardless of the attackers’ reports. However, the attackers may transmit over
the channel exclusively in Phase II, and the honest SUs may suffer from the collision penalty
caused by the attackers with expected reward in (18).
11Note that this state includes the case that all honest SUs sense the channel busy and (some) attackers sense idle.
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TABLE II
ATTACKERS’ OPTIMAL BEHAVIORS AND HONEST SUS’ BEHAVIORS
Sensing Decisions Attackers’ optimal behaviors Honest SUs’
behaviors
∑
i∈N Di = 0 Attack by reporting falsely and transmitting exclusively Wait
∑
i∈N Di = K ≥ 1
If P IN,K < MPBN,KCp, do not attack
Wait
If P IN,K ≥MPBN,KCp, attack by reporting truthfully and transmitting exclusively
We summarize the results in Propositions 1-3 as in Table II. Without any attack-prevention
mechanism, the attackers will utilize the spectrum opportunities exclusively, whereas the honest
SUs will never transmit regardless of their sensing decisions. What is worse, the honest SUs
may suffer from the collision penalty caused by the attackers.
Note that our current analytical results focus on one time slot, where the attackers want
to maximize their expected aggregate reward in the current time slot (i.e., the “attack-and-run”
scenario). Since attackers’ behaviors are independent over time slots, the above analytical results
also hold for the “stay-with-attacks” scenario.
Given many possible attack scenarios in Section IV, it is hard to identify attackers based on
their report orders and results in Phase I. The reasons are as follows.
• First, different SUs may have different sensing times to guarantee certain precision of
channel detection, and thus it is not possible to force everyone to report at the same time.
This means that there is always a last reporter. If all SUs are honest, then the last reporter
is not an attacker. Unless the fusion center is sure that there exists at least one attacker, it
is hard to tell that the last reporting SU is an attacker.
• Second, even the fusion center is aware of attacker(s), it is still difficult to punish attackers
effectively since the attackers (aware of such identification) can strategically change to report
not the last.
– When the attackers overhear some honest SU(s) reporting 1 (busy) at the beginning,
they can report immediately after their sensing and do not need to wait for the last
honest SU’s report. In this case, the fusion center’s decision is correct (H1) no matter
attackers’ manipulate their reports or not. But the attackers can still attack (i.e., violating
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the fusion center’s decision and transmit) as shown in Case C in Section IV. In this
case, the attackers still need to overhear all honest SUs’ reports.
– When the attackers overhear many honest SUs’ reporting 0 (idle), they may not wait
for the last honest SU’s report and can still manipulate their reports. In this case, such
identification still hurts honest SU(s) and the attackers still perform attacks although
they lose a little bit of information.
It should also be noted that it is possible for the fusion center to monitor the control channel
to check who are the attackers by exchanging their sensing results secretly in Phase I. It is also
possible that the fusion center can monitor the PU’s licensed later to see who disobey its decision
to transmit exclusively. But the above attack identifications require the fusion center to know
at least all SUs’ coding and modulation schemes. Even the fusion center has such information,
the attackers can still change their coding and modulation schemes (e.g., as some honest SUs),
or secure their communication to exchange sensing results in Phase I and their transmission in
Phase II, e.g., via MAC-layer encryptions, to avoid being identified by the fusion center.
The above discussions illustrate why we are interested in designing attack-prevention mech-
anisms without attack identification.
V. ATTACK-PREVENTION MECHANISM: A DIRECT PUNISHMENT
In this section, we consider the case in which the fusion center can directly charge a punishment
to the SUs when attacks are identified. We focus on the “attack-and-run” scenario in a single
time slot. The analysis also applies to the “stay-with-attacks” scenario as in Section IV. With
the proper choice of punishment, the proposed mechanism ensures that no attack will happen
and no one will be punished.
Let us denote the direct punishment as Cb, which is different from the collision penalty Cp
introduced in Section II-C. The fusion center will only charge the punishment to all SUs when
the PU detects an attack. Let us consider the following two scenarios:
• When the announcement at the fusion center is H1 (busy) in Phase I and a collision happens
in Phase II, the fusion center knows that an attack happens (as honest SUs will not transmit
in Phase II). In this case, all SUs are charged a direct punishment Cb by the fusion center
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Fig. 4. Direct punishment threshold Cthb (M) for different M and N cases with (PI , Pf , Pm, Cp)=(0.6, 0.08, 0.08, 6e+ 10).
(in addition to the collision penalty Cp charged by the PU).12
Note that when the announcement at the fusion center is H0 (idle) in Phase I, no direct
punishment will be triggered even if there is a collision in Phase II. This is because attackers
will not share the spectrum access opportunity with honest SUs as in Proposition 1, and such
collision can only the result of the missed detections of spectrum sensing.
The effectiveness of the attack-prevention mechanism depends on the choice of the punishment
Cb. Theorem 2 shows that a large enough Cb can prevent all possible attacks.
Theorem 2: For M attackers in the network, there exists a threshold Cthb (M), i.e.,
Cthb (M) =
PI
1− PI
(
1− Pf
Pm
)N
max
(
PfPm
(1− Pf )(1− Pm)
1
M
− Cp,
(
1
M
−
1
N
))
, ∀M ≥ 1,
(19)
such that any value Cb > Cthb (M) can prevent all attack scenarios described in Section IV.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix A. Next, we examine how the numbers of
honest SUs and attackers affect the threshold Cthb (M).
Observation 1: Cthb (M) is decreasing in the number of attackers M and increasing in the
number of honest SUs N −M . If the fusion center does not know the number of attackers, it
12The way for the fusion center to realize the punishment Cb is similar to the way to realize the collision penalty Cp. See
footnote 7 for details.
October 22, 2018 DRAFT
18
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
109
1010
1011
1012
Number of Attacker (M)
Th
re
sh
ol
d 
 C
bth
(M
)
 
 
PI=0.3
PI=0.5
PI=0.7
Fig. 5. Direct punishment threshold Cthb (M) for different M and PI cases with (Pf , Pm, Cp, N )=(0.08, 0.08, 6e+ 10, 11).
should set the threshold to be Cthb (1) = maxM≥1Cthb (M) to prevent all attacks.
Figure 4 shows the value of threshold Cthb (M) as a function of M for different values of
N .13 When the number of attackers increases, the total penalty to the group of attackers also
increases when an attack is confirmed (while the total transmission rate does not change), which
discourages the attacks to happen.
Figure 4 also shows that Cthb (M) increases with the number of honest SUs N −M for any
fixed M . This is because the more honest SUs’ sensing reports are overheard by the attackers,
the more accurately the attackers can estimate the actual channel state, and thus more likely the
attackers will launch an attack. As a result, a higher Cb is required to prevent attackers from
manipulating their sensing reports. Thus, the single attacker scenario (i.e., M = 1) is the most
challenging case for this attack-prevention mechanism.
Observation 2: The threshold Cthb (1) is increasing in the idle probability PI and non-increasing
in the collision penalty Cp.
Figure 5 shows that the value of threshold Cthb (M) is increasing in the idle probability PI .
A larger PI means a higher channel availability, and thus encourages the attackers to launch an
attack so that they can exclusively utilize the channel more frequently. A larger Cp discourages
13Since Pf and Pm must be less than 10% in 802.22 WRAN standard draft, thus the probability to trigger direct punishment
is very small under this choice of Pf and Pm. As a result, high Cthb (M) = Cthb (M)/r value is determined in Fig. 4 to eliminate
the attack benefit.
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the attackers from accessing the channel due to the possibility of paying a large collision penalty.
VI. ATTACK-PREVENTION MECHANISM: AN INDIRECT PUNISHMENT
The direct punishment scheme may be difficult to enforce for certain types of networks due
to practical constraints, such as implementation overhead and complexity. For example, if the
direct punishment is in the form of monetary payments from SUs to the fusion center, the fusion
center needs to have reliable channels to collect and monitor such payments [22], [39]. In this
section we propose an indirect punishment scheme that can effectively prevent attacks in the
“stay-with-attacks” scenario as long as the attackers care enough about future rewards. The key
idea is to terminate collaborative sensing once the fusion center detects an attack, which forces
the attackers to rely on their own sensing results in the future. This prevents attackers from
overhearing honest SU sensing reports, and results in an increase in missed detection probability
for attackers. Therefore, such indirect punishment will reduce the attackers’ incentives to attack.
The indirect punishment works as follows:
• When the fusion center announces H1 (busy) in Phase I and a collision happens in Phase
II, the indirect punishment is triggered and there is no collaborative sensing in future time
slots.14
Note that when the fusion center announces H0 (idle) in Phase I, no indirect punishment will
be triggered even if there is a collision in Phase II.
Similar to the direct punishment mechanism in Section V, no indirect punishment will be
triggered if all SUs behave honestly. The effectiveness of the indirect punishment depends on
the attackers’ performance when they are isolated from the honest SUs.
In the rest of the section, we make the following assumption:
A4 : Cp >
PI
1− PI
1− Pf
Pm
. (20)
A4 is derived from P I1,0−PB1,0Cp < 0, which implies that a single SU will not transmit based on
its own sensing decision (since it can be quite unreliable after the collaborative sensing breaks
down) even without interference from the other SUs. A4 is quite mild. When the number of
14The fusion center can achieve this by broadcasting to all SUs that there is no need to report local sensing decisions in the
future.
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SUs is reasonable (i.e., N > 7), Condition.I in Eq. (7) directly guarantees the satisfaction of
A4 in Eq. (20). Note that A4 only applies to this section.
To analyze the attackers’ dynamic decisions in the long-term “stay-with-attacks” scenario, we
formulate the problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) [18]. More specifically, we consider
an infinite horizon Markov decision process (S ′,A′, P, R), where the group of cooperative
attackers is the only decision-maker (collectively) over time.
• State set S ′: A state s ∈ S ′ describes the attackers’ knowledge of honest SUs’ sens-
ing decisions, their own sensing decisions, and whether the indirect punishment is trig-
gered: (∑i∈N\M D¯i, ∑i∈MDi, Punishment). When Punishment = off, ∑i∈N\M D¯i =∑
i∈N\MDi. When Punishment = on,
∑
i∈N\M D¯i = Unknown as the attackers do not
know the honest SUs’ sensing decisions. The size of set S ′ is [(N−M+1)(M+1)+(M+1)].
The attackers know the state during each time slot.
• Attackers’ action set A′: The action am of an attacker m ∈M is a tuple: (report to the fusion
center, spectrum access decision). When the indirect punishment is not triggered, there are
four possible actions: (idle, wait), (busy, wait), (idle, transmit), and (busy, transmit). When
the indirect punishment is triggered, an attacker’s action can be (N/A, transmit) or (N/A,
wait), where N/A means that the attackers do not report. We define a = {am, ∀m ∈ M}
as the action vector of all attackers and A′ contains all feasible values of a.
• Transition probability P (a, s, s′): The transition probability that actions a in a state s at time
slot t will lead to state s′ in time slot t+ 1 is P (a, s, s′) = Pr(st+1 = s′|st = s,at = a).
This depends on both state s and actions a, and is independent of time t.
• Attackers’ expected aggregated reward R(a, s): The attackers’ received reward after taking
actions a in state s of a time slot.
Compared to the reward in the current time slot, the attackers may value future rewards less.
This can be captured by a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). We further define a stationary policy u
as a mapping between the set of states S ′ to the action set A′. In other words, a policy defines
what action to take in each possible state. The attackers’ objective is to choose a policy u from
policy set U to maximize the long-term expected aggregate reward:
max
u∈U
∞∑
t=0
δtR(u(s), s), (21)
Let us denote the attackers’ optimal long-term expected aggregate rewards by LRH and LRDH
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if they behave honestly and dishonestly, respectively.
Since attackers’ behaviors and rewards before and after the indirect punishment are quite
different, we need to study them separately. Here we first consider the attackers’ behaviors
before the punishment. Let us consider the case where at least one SU senses the channel busy,
i.e.,
∑
i∈N Di = K ≥ 1. The attackers’ optimal behaviors can be classified into two cases:
• Non-aggressive Transmission: The attackers will not attack for any K ≥ 1, which is true if
Case.NT :P IN,1 −MP
B
N,1Cp < 0, (22)
where the attackers’ exclusive transmission opportunity does not compensate their collision
penalty.
• Aggressive Transmission: The attackers may attack even if K ≥ 1, which is true if
Case.AT :P IN,1 −MP
B
N,1Cp ≥ 0. (23)
In the rest of this section, we focus on Case.NT with M ≥ 1 attackers. The discussion for
Case.AT with M ≥ 1 is given in Appendix C.
We analyze the conditions under which attacks can be completely prevented via an indirect
punishment. We first need to understand the attackers’ performance degradation once the indirect
punishment is triggered. Since the attackers are cooperative, they can always exchange sensing
information among themselves. Depending on whether the attackers will transmit after the
indirect punishment, we have two cases:
• Weak Cooperation: The attackers will not transmit even when all attackers sense the channel
idle,
Case.WC : P IM,0 −MP
B
M,0Cp ≤ 0. (24)
This means that the attackers feel that their own sensing results are not reliable enough (with
a high missed detection probability). Case.WC also implies that the attackers will definitely
not transmit if one or more attackers sense the channel busy. Due to assumption A4, the
reward in Eq. (24) is an increasing function of the number of attackers M . Then we can
also write Eq. (24) as an upper bound of M , i.e., Case.WC corresponds to a small number
of attackers M .
• Strong Cooperation: The attackers will transmit when all attackers sense the channel idle,
Case.SC : P IM,0 −MP
B
M,0Cp > 0. (25)
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δthSC(M) =
(
1 +
(PI(1− Pf )
N 1
N
− (1− PI)(Pm)
NCp)− (PI(1− Pf )
M 1
M
− (1− PI)(Pm)
MCp)
1
M
− 1
N
1− PI
PI
(
Pm
1− Pf
)N )−1
.
(29)
This means that the attackers feel that their own sensing results (collectively) are accurate
enough (with a low missed detection probability) even taking the collision penalty Cp into
consideration. We can also write Eq. (25) as a lower bound of M , i.e., Case.SC corresponds
to a large number of attackers M .
Obviously, it is more challenging to prevent attacks in Case.SC than Case.WC. However, we can
show that in Case.SC the attackers’ expected aggregate reward in one time slot with punishment
triggered is always less than their reward when they always behave honestly. In other words, as
long as the attackers care enough about future reward (i.e., the discount factor δ is high enough),
we can still prevent attacks even in Case.SC (and thus in Case.WC as well).
Lemma 1: The attackers’ optimal long-term expected aggregate rewards in Case.WC and Case.SC
are
LRHWC = LR
H
SC = Pr
(∑
i∈N
Di = 0
)(
P IN,0
1
N
− PBN,0Cp
)
M
1− δ
, (26)
LRDHWC =
Pr(
∑
i∈N Di = 0)(P
I
N,0 −MP
B
N,0Cp)
1− δ(1− Pr(
∑
i∈N Di = 0)P
B
N,0)
, (27)
and LRDHSC in
LRDHSC = LR
DH
WC +
δ
1− δ
Pr
(∑
i∈N
Di = 0
)
PBN,0Pr(
∑
i∈MDi = 0)(P
I
M,0 −MP
B
M,0Cp)
1− δ(Pr(
∑
i∈N Di > 0) + Pr(
∑
i∈N Di = 0)P
I
N,0)
.
(28)
Here the superscripts “H” and “DH” indicates honest and dishonest behaviors of attackers,
respectively.
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix D, where we can show that LRDHWC < LRHWC
and LRDHSC < LRHSC when δ goes close to 1. This leads to the following result.
Theorem 3: The indirect punishment can prevent all attack in “stay-with-attacks” scenario if
the discount factor δ satisfies the following condition:
• Weak cooperation (Case.WC): for any 1 ≤M < N , we need δ > δthWC(M) where
δthWC(M) =
1
1 +
PI(1−Pf )N
1
N
−(1−PI)(Pm)NCp
1
M
− 1
N
1−PI
PI
(
Pm
1−Pf
)N . (30)
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Fig. 6. Discount factor threshold δthSC(M) with (PI , Pf , Pm, Cp) = (0.6, 0.08, 0.08, 3e+ 18).
• Strong cooperation (Case.SC): for any 1 ≤ M < N , we need δ > δthSC(M) where δthSC is
given in Eq. (29).
If the fusion center does not know the number of attackers, M , it can choose δ > max0<M<N δthWC(M)
and δ > max0<M<N δthSC(M) for the two cases, respectively.
Although it is not shown in Theorem 3, we want to mention that the indirect punishment
can still partially prevent attacks even δ is less than the discount factor threshold. Intuitively,
attackers do not want to trigger indirect punishment and lose the opportunity to overhear honest
SUs’ sensing results. Thus they will behave more conservatively compared to the case with no
indirect punishment. For example, if some SUs’ sensing results indicate a busy channel state,
the attackers will not attack to trigger the long-term punishment.
We have the following interesting observations.
Observation 3: (Impact of network size:) Both δthWC(M) in Case.WC and δthSC(M) in Case.SC
are increasing in the number of the honest SUs N −M . Threshold δthWC(M) is decreasing in
the number of the attackers M , while δthSC(M) is increasing in the number of the attackers M .
Figure 6 plots δthSC(M) as a function of N and M in Case.SC. The corresponding result in
Case.WC can also be obtained based on Eq. (30).
With more honest SUs N −M , attackers have a less incentive to share the spectrum with
honest SUs in the long-term and a higher incentive to attack and transmit exclusively. Thus a
higher δ is needed to prevent attacks.
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A larger number of attackers M has two effects: (a) a higher total collision penalty (whenever a
collision happens), and (b) attackers’ better estimation of channel condition (once the punishment
is triggered). It turns out that effect (a) dominates in Case.WC and effect (b) dominates in Case.SC,
which explains why the δ threshold decreases in M in Case.WC and increases in M in Case.SC.
In Fig. 6, the most attack-vulnerable case happens when almost all SUs are attackers (M → N),
in which case LRDHSC → LRHSC and δthSC(M) in (29) is close to 1.
Observation 4: (Impact of collision penalty Cp:) δthWC(M) in Case.WC is increasing in the
collision penalty Cp, while δthSC(M) in Case.SC is decreasing in Cp.
In Case.WC, the collision penalty Cp only affects the time slots before the punishment is
triggered. A higher Cp means a smaller long-term expected reward as a conservative honest SU
(by comparing LRHWC in Eq. (26) to LRDHWC in Eq. (27)), and thus more incentives to attack. In
Case.SC, a larger value of Cp hurts the reward of attackers more after punishment than before
punishment. This is because the transmission probability before punishment is Pr(
∑
i∈N Di = 0)
(i.e., all SUs sense idle), which is smaller than the transmission probability after punishment
Pr(
∑
i∈MDi = 0) (i.e., all attackers sense idle). Thus a larger Cp discourages the attacks in
Case.SC.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Collaborative spectrum sensing is vulnerable to sensing data falsification attacks. In this paper,
we focused on a challenging attack scenario in which multiple cooperative attackers can overhear
the honest SU sensing reports, but the honest SUs are unaware of the existence of attackers. We
first analyzed all possible attack scenarios without any attack-prevention mechanisms. In this
case, we showed that honest SUs will have no chance to transmit and may even suffer from the
collision penalty charged by the PU. Then, we proposed two attack-prevention mechanisms with
direct and indirect punishments. Both mechanisms do not require identification of the attackers.
The direct punishment can effectively prevent all attacks in both “attack-and-run” and “stay-
with-attacks,” and the indirect punishment can prevent all attacks in the long-run if the attackers
care enough about their future rewards.
There are several possible ways to extend the results in this paper.
• First, we can consider the case where PU’s traffic changes slowly over time (e.g., TV
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transmitters), where we need to consider the correlation between spectrum occupancies
over different time slots. In this case, we should to use a much more complicated MDP
model than the one in Section VI.
• Second, we can study the case that the fusion center knows all SUs’ transmission character-
istics (e.g., modulation and coding schemes) and can monitor attackers’ sensing information
communication in Phase I and attackers’ transmissions in Phase II. In this case, the fusion
center may be able to identify attackers. However, the attackers can change their modulation
and coding schemes (e.g., as some honest SUs) or secure their transmissions (via MAC-layer
encryptions) to avoid being identified.
• Third, we can study the denial-of-service attacks. Throughout this paper, we consider that
attackers are rational and are only interested in maximizing their own rewards. For denial
of service attacks, however, the attackers’ objective is to let honest SUs lose transmission
opportunities or break down the effectiveness of collaborative sensing.
• Finally, we can consider imperfect control channel between SUs and the fusion center (e.g.,
some SUs receive false announcement from the fusion center). In that case, an indirect
punishment can be triggered due to channel communication errors instead of attacks. We
need to design the indirect punishment which will resume collaborative sensing after a
period of time (instead of an infinitely long punishment).
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
By examining different possible states, we can derive the attackers’ optimal behaviors. Then
in response to the attackers’ optimal behaviors, we find the proper value of direct punishment
Cb to prevent all attacks.
1) (∑i∈N\MDi = 0, ∑i∈MDi = 0): When the sensing results are all 0, then the attackers
may report truthfully or falsely in the Phase I:
• If all attackers report 0 in Phase I, then the announcement at the fusion center is H0 (idle),
and all honest SUs will transmit. It is easy to check that all attackers will transmit with
positive expected aggregate reward in (11).
• If some attackers report 1 in Phase I, then the announcement at the fusion center is H1
(busy) and all honest SUs will not transmit.
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– If some attackers with number 1 ≤MT ≤M choose to transmit, the attackers’ expected
aggregate reward is:
Ra(s) = P
I
N,0 −MP
B
N,0(Cp + Cb). (31)
which does not depend on MT and may not be larger than (11).
– If all attackers wait, the attackers’ expected aggregate reward equals 0 and is less than
(11).
To prevent attacks in this state, high value of Cb should be set to make (11) larger than (31).
2) (∑i∈N\MDi = 0, ∑i∈MDi = M¯ ≥ 1): The attackers may report truthfully or falsely in
Phase I:
• If all attackers report 0 in Phase I, then the announcement at the fusion center is H0 (idle),
and all honest SUs will transmit. It is easy to check that all attackers will transmit and their
expected aggregate reward is given by (15) which is negative.
• If some attackers report 1 in Phase I, then the announcement at the fusion center is H1
(busy), and all honest SUs will not transmit.
– If some attackers with number 1 ≤MT ≤M choose to transmit, the attackers’ expected
aggregate reward is:
Ra(s) = P
I
N,M¯ −MP
B
N,M¯ (Cp + Cb). (32)
which does not depend on MT and may be negative.
– If all attackers wait, the attackers’ expected aggregate reward equals 0 which is larger
than (15).
To prevent attacks in this state, high value of Cb should be set to make (32) smaller than 0.
3) (∑i∈N\MDi = K ≥ 1, ∑i∈MDi = M¯ ∈ {0, ...,M}): When at least one honest SU’s
sensing decision is 1, then no matter what attackers report in Phase I, the fusion center always
makes correct announcement H1 (busy). All honest SUs will not transmit in Phase II.
• If some attackers with number 1 ≤MT ≤M choose to transmit in Phase II, the attackers’
expected aggregate reward is:
Ra(s) = P
I
N,K+M¯ − P
B
N,K+M¯(Cp + Cb), (33)
which does not depend on MT and can be positive or negative.
• If all attackers wait in Phase II, the attackers’ expected aggregate reward equals 0.
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To prevent all attacks in this state, high value of Cb should be set to make (17) smaller than 0.
Then we can summarize the requirement of Cb to prevent attacks in all possible states in
Theorem 2.
B. Relaxation of Assumptions A1 and A3
Here we will relax Assumption A1 and consider the general case where SUs have heteroge-
neous detection performances (i.e., different false alarm probabilities Pf and missed detection
probabilities Pm) and transmission rates. We are interested to know whether our attack-prevention
mechanisms (with some minor modification of system parameters) can still apply, and how to
change punishments to attackers. Due to the page limit, we only examine the direct punishment
here. The effectiveness of the indirect punishment can be shown similarly.
Observation 1 in Section V showed that the single attacker scenario (M = 1) is the most
challenging attack scenario for the direct punishment mechanism. Thus we will focus on the
single attacker scenario to check the effectiveness of this mechanism. We label the attacker as
the N th SU, and we denote its false alarm probability and missed detection probability as Pf,A
and Pm,A, respectively. For the ease of analysis, we still consider all honest SUs having the same
Pf and Pm.15
We denote the attacker’s transmission rate as rA, and an honest SU i < N has a different
transmission rate ri. When all SUs share the same transmission opportunity using TDMA mode,
the attacker obtains a data rate of rA/N .
First of all, we need to change the two notations in (5) and (6) as follows. When 0 ≤ k ≤ N−1,
honest SUs sense the channel busy
(∑N−1
i=1 Di = k
)
and the attacker senses idle (DN = 0). The
condition probability that the channel is actually idle is
P IN,(k)+(0) : = Pr
(
idle|
N−1∑
i=1
Di = k,DN = 0
)
=
PI(1− Pf)N−1−kP kf (1− Pf,A)
PI(1− Pf)N−1−kP kf (1− Pf,A) + (1− PI)(1− Pm)
kPN−1−km Pm,A
. (34)
15If we consider different detection performances for honest SUs, the analysis becomes more complicated without adding
more meaningful insights. Intuitively, as honest SUs’ overall detection performance becomes more precise, the attacker can
predict the channel state more precisely by overhearing honest SUs’ reports.
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The conditional probability that the channel is actually busy is
PBN,(k)+(0) = 1− P
I
N,(k)+(0). (35)
When 0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1, honest SUs sense the channel busy
(∑N−1
i=1 Di = k
)
and the attacker
also senses busy (DN = 1). The conditional idle and busy probabilities are respectively
P IN,(k)+(1) : = Pr
(
idle|
N−1∑
i=1
Di = k,DN = 1
)
=
PI(1− Pf)N−1−kP kf Pf,A
PI(1− Pf)N−1−kP kf Pf,A + (1− PI)(1− Pm)
kPN−1−km (1− Pm,A)
, (36)
and
PBN,(k)+(1) = 1− P
I
N,(k)+(1). (37)
With the help of above notations, we can similarly analyze how the direct punishment works
and how to determine the punishment as in Section V.
Theorem 4: For the single attacker in the network, there exists a threshold
Cthb =
PI
1− PI
(
1− Pf
Pm
)N−1
1− Pf,A
Pm,A
N − 1
N
rA, (38)
such that any value Cb > Cthb can prevent all attack scenarios described in Section IV.
Proof. By examining different possible states as in Section IV, we can derive the attacker’s
optimal behavior. Then in response to the attacker’s optimal behavior, we find the proper value
of direct punishment Cb to prevent all attacks.
1) State s =
(∑N−1
i=1 Di = 0, DN = 0
)
: When the sensing results are all 0, then the attackers
may report truthfully or falsely in the Phase I:
• If the attacker reports 0 in Phase I, then the announcement at the fusion center is H0 (idle),
and all honest SUs will transmit. It is easy to check that the attacker will also transmit and
receive a positive expected reward
RA(s) = P
I
N,(0)+(0)
rA
N
− PBN,(0)+(0)Cp > 0, (39)
which is similar to (3).
• If the attacker reports 1 in Phase I, then the announcement at the fusion center is H1 (busy)
and all honest SUs will not transmit.
– If the attacker chooses to transmit, its expected reward is
RA(s) = P
I
N,(0)+(0)rA − P
B
N,(0)+(0)(Cp + Cb), (40)
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which may or may not be larger than (39).
– If the attacker waits, its expected reward equals 0 and is less than (39).
To prevent attacks in this state, a high value of Cb should be set to make (39) larger than (40).
In other words,
Cb >
PI(1− Pf,A)
(1− PI)Pm,A
(
1− Pf
Pm
)N−1
N − 1
N
rA, (41)
where we denote the term in the right-hand side as threshold Cth1b . It is easy to check that Cth1b
is decreasing in both Pf,A and Pm,A, but is increasing in PI , N , and rA.
2) State s =
(∑N−1
i=1 Di = 0, DN = 1
)
: The attacker may report truthfully or falsely in
Phase I:
• If the attacker reports 0 in Phase I, then the announcement at the fusion center is H0 (idle),
and all honest SUs will transmit. It is easy to check that the attacker will also transmit and
its expected reward is
RA(s) = P
I
N,(0)+(1)
1
N
rA − P
B
N,(0)+(1)Cb, (42)
which is negative as required by the optimality of OR-rule.
• If the attacker reports 1 in Phase I, then the announcement at the fusion center is H1 (busy),
and all honest SUs will not transmit.
– If the attacker chooses to transmit, its expected reward is
RA(s) = P
I
N,(0)+(1)rA − P
B
N,(0)+(1)(Cp + Cb), (43)
which may or may not be negative.
– If the attacker waits, its expected reward equals 0 which is larger than (42).
To prevent attacks in this state, a high value of Cb should be set to make (43) smaller than 0.
This gives to
Cb >
PIPf,A
(1− PI)(1− Pm,A)
(
1− Pf
Pm
)N−1
rA − Cp, (44)
where we denote the term in the right-hand side as threshold Cth2b .
3) State s =
(∑N−1
i=1 Di = K ≥ 1, DN = M¯ ∈ {0, 1}
)
: When at least one honest SU’s
sensing decision is 1, then no matter what the attacker reports in Phase I, the fusion center
always makes correct announcement H1 (busy). All honest SUs will not transmit in Phase II.
• If the attacker chooses to transmit in Phase II, its expected reward is
RA(s) = P
I
N,(K)+(M¯)rA − P
B
N,(K)+(M¯)(Cp + Cb), (45)
October 22, 2018 DRAFT
30
which may be positive or negative.
• If the attacker waits in Phase II, its expected reward equals 0.
To prevent all attacks in this state, a high value of Cb should be set to make (45) smaller than
0. This gives to
Cb >
PI
1− PI
(
1− Pf
Pm
)N−1(
PfPm
(1− Pf)(1− Pm)
)K (
1− Pf,A
Pm,A
)1−M¯ (
Pf,A
1− Pm,A
)M¯
rA − Cp,
(46)
which is maximized when K = 1 and M¯ = 0 due to Pm < 0.1 and Pf < 0.1 as explained in
footnote 13. To prevent all attacks in this state, we should require
Cb >
PI
1− PI
(
1− Pf
Pm
)N−1(
PfPm
(1− Pf)(1− Pm)
)
1− Pf,A
Pm,A
rA − Cp, (47)
where the right-hand side is denoted as threshold Cth3b .
To summarize, the requirement of Cb to prevent attacks is Cb > max
(
Cth1b , C
th2
b , C
th3
b
)
in all
possible states. It is easy to check that Cth1b > Cth2b and Cth1b > Cth3b , and we can conclude the
results in Theorem 4.
Observation 5: Cthb is increasing in both idle probability PI and the number of honest SUs
N − 1.
A larger PI means a higher channel availability, and thus encourages the attacker to launch
an attack so that it can exclusively utilize the channel more frequently. Also, as the honest SU
number N−1 increases, the more honest SUs’ sensing reports are overheard by the attacker. The
attacker can estimate the actual channel state more accurately, and it is more likely to launch an
attack.
Observation 6: Threshold Cthb is increasing in the attacker’s rate rA, and it is decreasing in
the attacker’s false alarm probability Pf,A and missed detection probability Pm,A.
As the attacker’s rate rA increases, it values the exclusive transmission opportunity more. The
attacker has a higher incentive to attack, and a higher Cthb is required to prevent the attack.
Figure 7 shows the threshold Cthb as a function of the attacker’s false alarm probability Pf,A
and missed detection probability Pm,A. Intuitively, as Pf,A increases, the attacker has higher
probability to overlook the channel access opportunity and it has less incentive to launch an
attack. As Pm,A increases, the attacker has a higher probability to trigger direct punishment and
thus it is more conservative to attack. In both cases, the fusion center can to announce a lower
Cb to prevent all attacks.
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Fig. 7. Direct punishment threshold Cthb for different Pf,A and Pm,A with (Pf , Pm, N )=(0.05, 0.05, 11).
C. Attack Prevention in Case.AT of Section VI
Section VI focuses on Case.NT. Here we discuss Case.AT with multiple attackers (M ≥ 1). Ta-
ble II in Section IV shows that with no punishment, the attacker may still obtain a positive reward
by transmission even when at least one SU senses the channel busy in Case.AT. Next, we discuss
the attacker’s action u(s) under any given state s =
(∑
i∈N\M D¯i,
∑
i∈MDi, Punishment
)
.
• State s =
(∑
i∈N\MDi,
∑
i∈MDi = K, off
)
: Before the indirect punishment is triggered,
the attackers may purposely change their attack behaviors (comparing to the actions in
Table II in Section IV) in some states to deter punishment.
– s = (0, 0, off): at least one attacker still chooses the action (busy, transmit) as in
Table II. In this state, the attackers obtain the largest expected aggregate reward P IN,0−
MPBN,0Cp and induces the smallest missed detection probability PBN,0 to trigger pun-
ishment.
– s = (
∑
i∈N\MDi ≥ 0,
∑
i∈MDi ≥ 0, off): the attackers may choose not to attack
even if they can obtain a positive expected aggregate reward in current time slot, which
is different from no punishment scenario in Table II. This is because that the attackers
fear to trigger the long-term indirect punishment, and they will attack only when missed
detection probability to trigger punishment is low with small
∑
i∈N Di.
• State s =
(
Unknown,
∑
i∈MDi = K, on
)
: After the indirect punishment is triggered, the
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attackers know their own sensing results and will choose the actions as follows.
– Weak Cooperation (Case.WC): the attackers will choose the action (N/A, wait) even if
all attackers sense the channel idle. Otherwise, they will receive a negative expected
aggregate reward P IM,K −MPBM,KCp.
– Strong Cooperation (Case.SC): the attackers will choose the action (N/A, transmit)
when all attackers sense the channel idle. Even if at least one attackers senses the
channel busy, they will still choose the action (N/A, transmit) if P IM,K ≥MPBM,KCp.
Lemma 2: The attackers’ optimal long-term expected aggregate rewards in Case.WC and Case.SC
are
LRHWC = LR
H
SC =
M
1− δ
Pr
(∑
i∈N
Di = 0
)(
P IN,0
1
N
− PBN,0Cp
)
, (48)
by behaving honestly, and
LRDHWC = max
0≤z≤N
∑z
k=0 Pr(
∑
i∈N Di = k)(P
I
N,k −MP
B
N,kCp)
1− δ(1−
∑z
k=0 Pr(
∑
i∈N Di = k)P
B
N,k)
(49)
LRDHSC = max
0≤z≤N
z∑
k=0
Pr(
∑
i∈N
Di = k)[
P IN,k −MP
B
N,kCp
1− δ(1−
∑z
k=0 Pr(
∑
i∈N Di = k)P
B
N,k)
+
δ
1− δ
PBN,kPr(
∑
i∈MDi = 0)(P
I
M,0 −MP
B
M,0Cp)
1− δ(1−
∑z
k=0 Pr(
∑
i∈N Di = k)P
B
N,k)
], (50)
by behaving dishonestly. Here the superscript “H” indicates honest behaviors of attackers and
“DH” indicates dishonest behaviors. We denote the value of z that achieves the maximum of
(49) in Case.WC or (50) in Case.SC as z∗. The attackers’ optimal policy u∗ has a threshold
structure as follows.
• If ∑i∈N Di ≤ z∗: At least one attacker will take the action (busy, transmit) before the
indirect punishment is triggered. After the indirect punishment is triggered,
– Case.WC: all attackers will take the action (N/A, wait).
– Case.SC: all attackers will take the action (N/A, transmit) if P IM,K > MPBM,KCp where
K attackers sense the channel busy. Otherwise, they will take the action (N/A, wait).
• If ∑i∈N Di > z∗: The attackers will take the action (busy, wait) before the indirect
punishment is triggered. After the indirect punishment is triggered,
– Case.WC: all attackers will take the action (N/A, wait).
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– Case.SC: all attackers will take the action (N/A, transmit) if P IM,K > MPBM,KCp where
K attackers sense the channel busy. Otherwise, they will take the action (N/A, wait).
We can show in Lemma 2 that LRDHWC < LRHWC in Case.WC and LRDHSC < LRHSC in Case.SC
when δ is close to 1. Thus we can find an appropriate discount factor threshold to ensure that
LRDHWC < LR
H
WC for Case.WC and LRDHSC < LRHSC for Case.SC.
Theorem 5: For multiple attackers in Case.AT, there exists a threshold δth ∈ (0, 1) such that
no attacks will happen if δ > δth.
D. Proof of Lemma 1
In Case.NT, the attackers will only attack with the action (busy, transmit) when all SUs sense
the channel idle when the indirect punishment is not triggered. But they may or may not transmit
after the punishment is triggered.
1) Case.WC (Weak Cooperation): In Case.WC, the attackers will not transmit even when all
attackers sense the channel idle after the punishment is triggered.
If the attackers behave as honest SUs, the indirect punishment will never be triggered. They
share the spectrum opportunities with the honest SUs when all SUs sense the channel idle. The
attackers’ long-term expected aggregate reward is
LRHWC =
∞∑
t=0
δtPr
(∑
i∈N
Di = 0
)(
P IN,0
1
N
− PBN,0Cp
)
M,
which can be rewritten as in (26).
If the attackers attack with the action (busy, transmit) when all SUs sense the channel idle
(∑i∈N Di = 0), then in time slot t = 0 the indirect punishment will be triggered with the missed
detection probability PBN,0. If no collision happens with the probability P IN,0, the attack will not
be detected and the attackers will attack again if all SUs sense the channel idle in the next time
slot. By focusing on time slot t = 0, the attackers’ long-term expected aggregate reward is
LRDHWC = Pr
(∑
i∈N
Di > 0
)
δLRDHWC + Pr
(∑
i∈N
Di = 0
)[
P IN,0
(
1 + δLRDHWC
)
− PBN,0(MCp)
]
.
We can then recursively rewrite LRDHWC as in (27).
2) Case.SC (Strong Cooperation): In Case.SC, the attackers will still transmit when all
attackers sense the channel idle after the punishment is triggered.
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If the attackers behave as honest SUs, no indirect punishment will be triggered and they will
receive the same long-term expected aggregate reward in (26).
If the attackers attack with the action (busy, transmit) when all SUs sense the channel idle in
time slot t = 0, we can derive the attackers’ long-term expected aggregate reward similar as the
Case.WC,
LRDHSC = Pr
(∑
i∈N
Di > 0
)
δLRDHSC + Pr
(∑
i∈N
Di = 0
)
·
[
P IN,0(1 + δLR
DH
SC )− P
B
N,0MCp + P
B
N,0
δ
1− δ
Pr
(∑
i∈M
Di = 0
)
(P IM,0 −MP
B
M,0Cp))
]
.
The only difference here is that the attackers can still obtain a positive expected aggregate reward
after the punishment is triggered. Then we can recursively rewrite LRDHSC as in (28).
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